Things have improved recently. However, should Ankara intervene in Syria against the "Alawite" al-Assad regime and militarily support the "Sunni" uprising, some in the Turkish Alevi community might be inclined to view this as a "Sunni attack" against "fellow Alevis. All this might tie Turkey's hands in Syria. Still, Ankara could have a way out of this conundrum, alleviating concerns that a Turkish intervention would serve sectarian Sunni interests to the detriment of the Alawites or Alevis.
This is why Ankara needs to reach out to the Turkish Alevis, informing them of the humanitarian nature of its Syria policy. Turkey should also reach out to Syrian Alawites to build confidence among them, for instance ensuring that prominent Alawite members of the Syrian regime take refuge in Turkey when they defect. Alawites are not Alevi, but that could easily get lost in translation unless Ankara pays attention to this delicate issue as it tries to deal with al-Assad.
Apr 17, About the Authors. Soner Cagaptay. To top. Brief Analysis. The Harrowing of Mustafa Kadhimi. The Future of Putin's War in Syria. In , the non-Sunni population of Syria shrank to about 20 percent, compared to 30 percent in Fifty years ago, when Alawis experienced higher poverty and illiteracy rates, their fertility rate was also high, but it fell sharply as access to education and administrative jobs increased.
Moreover, the Alawis, unlike the Sunnis, are not compelled to have a male descendant. While the Alawi fertility rate has fallen, that of their Sunni counterparts remains above three children per woman, even in higher social classes. Over time, for example, the proportion of Alawis in the army and the intelligence services decreased. At the time the civil war began, Sunni soldiers constituted a majority of the Syrian Army, though Alawis retained a disproportionate share of the posts held by senior officers.
Since the beginning of the conflict, however, the composition of the army has changed, with Alawis the majority at all echelons. This is why it has been so difficult for the Syrian Army to defeat the insurgency and why the regime has had to depend heavily on the support of Hezbollah.
Indeed, the Alawi community is unable to provide enough soldiers to fight against the numerous rebels coming from abroad and from the large Sunni population. The Alawis have privileged access to state employment thanks to their deep integration into the networks [5] of Syrian power. Obvious discrimination in public sector hiring has caused frustration among Sunnis, but the fact that Alawis are generally more assured of getting jobs does not mean that they have a higher standard of living since government salaries are relatively low.
An Alawi middle class emerged with the growth of the civil service, and over the past decade the freezing of public sector recruitment has affected the Alawi community less than any other because Alawis are protected by a system of political patronage. But the freeze has resulted in a high rate of unemployment among Alawi youth in the coastal region and has also had disastrous political consequences for Bashar al-Assad, because more than 80 percent of the Alawi community works for the state.
In fact, since coming to power, Bashar has supported the Alawi community less than his father, calculating that it would feel obliged to support him anyway in order to maintain its privileges. Instead, he made it a priority to integrate the Sunni and Christian economic elites into his inner circle and share with them the benefits of economic liberalization. The Alawi community has not always given its full support to the regime.
In the s, the main Marxist opposition movement, the Communist Action Party, attracted many young Alawis. In the ongoing revolution, large protests against the regime have not mobilized the Alawi community, but some Alawis have joined demonstrations, and the opposition includes many Alawi figures such as Aref Dalila, an academic who spent 10 years in prison for his criticism of the government.
Protests in the coastal region did not lead to an escalation of violence as occurred in Homs because the Sunni rebel enclaves were quickly contained by the army. The protests found fertile ground in Homs because Alawis represent a minority of the population in the city and the surrounding countryside. In spring , the tension in Homs between the communities was palpable.
Taxis refused to drive passengers from Sunni to Alawi areas, and clashes proliferated along the borders of these areas. Kidnappings and assassinations on religious grounds have also been reported. Share Flipboard Email.
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